the other discourse shares nothing of that meaning, just as one name (1) may share with another name (2) only in the entity that both of them designate. For instance, Āyat al-Kursī—the Throne Verse—and the declaration, “Qul huwa Allahu aḥad” (Say: He is Allah, One), and similar passages all point to the inner meaning that subsists in the Divine Self and pertains to Allah’s attributes. By contrast, the Verse of Debt (3), Sūrat Tabbat Yadā Abī Lahab, and the like possess additional meanings: censuring certain creatures and commanding particular acts (4). The censure of that creature and the report about him are not the praise and commendation of Allah; the meaning of the one is not the meaning of the other, and there is no common element between them (5) in external reality, unlike the case of two names whose denotation is the same existent being. Indeed, the meanings of those two verses are by no means one and the same (6); this meaning is in no respect that meaning. They do, however, share (7) the fact that each is speech uttered by the Speaker [together with its meaning—one term for the meaning and another for the expression in which it subsists] (8). This is like the likeness of two instances of life—this is life and that is life—or of two existents—this is existence and that is existence. Such likeness does not require that one of them is the other in external reality at all; so too the meanings of these utterances do not require that one of them is the other (9) in external reality. This is known by immediate, innate intuition (10) and is easy to grasp for anyone who reflects upon it. Whoever denies this is among the most blatant rejecters of necessary, innate knowledge—even if it were to lapse.