among the synonyms, while others treat it as a third, entirely separate class that they sometimes call “the equivalent.”

The real aim, however, is to grasp the meaning. Thus, when one says:

“ar-Raḥmān, ar-Raḥīm,”

or says:

“al-‘Alīm,” “al-Qadīr,”

or says:

“as-Samī‘,” “al-Baṣīr,”

the first pair points to the One named by way of the attribute of mercy, the second by the attribute of knowledge, the third by the attribute of power, the fourth by the attribute of hearing, and the fifth by the attribute of sight. None of these attributes is identical to another, and this is something that neither they ⦗1⦘ nor anyone else ⦗1⦘ dispute. Each name indicates an attribute of the Lord that the other names do not, even though all of them agree in indicating the One named.

Admittedly, a given name may imply the meaning of another by way of necessary implication, for every name points to the Essence, and the Essence entails all the attributes. Yet such implication is not the lexical signification of the name itself, and implication ⦗2⦘ likewise requires that one already know ⦗3⦘ those attributes from a source other than the name; hence the name itself is not what conveys them.

Accordingly, the multiplicity of Allah’s names does not ⦗4⦘ entail ⦗5⦘ a multiplicity in the One named; rather, it entails a multiplicity of the attributes indicated by those names. These scholars do not ⦗6⦘ contest the existence of multiple attributes in general, and their leading authorities ⦗7⦘ do not claim that the attributes are limited to a fixed number. Instead, they say, “This is what we have come to know; He may well possess attributes of which we have no knowledge.”

Thus, although the One named is a single reality, the meanings conveyed by His names are numerous—