namely, that it is an attribute poised to perceive whatever is presented to it. (1) Should an objector say, “That would require the continual renewal of the attribute’s connections,” we answer: What harm is there in that, so long as it has never been proven that such connections are concrete entities in external reality? (2) This, in fact, is the very formulation of the doctrine. Yet even if we were to concede that this category is invalid, why could it not be—(3) as the Karrāmiyyah hold—(4) something newly originated within His very Essence?

His statement (5) runs: “That would make [the Divine Essence] a receptacle for temporal events.” We reply: If by this you mean (6) that these attributes arise in the Most Exalted Essence after previously not being there, (7) then that is precisely the position; so on what grounds do you declare it impossible? But if you mean something (8) other than that, spell it out so that we may address it. This is likewise the answer to his claim, “That would necessitate change in the Essence of Allah.” (9)

I said: At this point he has himself admitted the weakness of the first reply. The speaker’s formulation—“an attribute readied to perceive what is presented to it, whose opposite, the negation of hearing and sight, is actual perception” (10)—raises the question: What, then, is the difference between the attribute and the very act of perception? Then, upon the occurrence