knowledge, and (1) that knowledge may pertain to what does not yet exist. Thus the advocate of distinction could say: His state before the existence of the known object (2) and afterward is one and the same.
Abū ʿAbd Allah al-Rāzī (3) mentioned this very objection and, after offering a reply that was less than adequate, adopted the position of the Karrāmiyyah (4). The opponent’s argument was that hearing and sight cannot be eternal, for every act of perception requires an object and does not relate to what is nonexistent; therefore the affirmation (5) of hearing and sight for the universe before it existed is impossible. Furthermore, they do not posit within Allah’s Essence any entity by which He hears and sees; rather, in their view, hearing and sight are themselves the very act of perception. Nor can these faculties be contingent, for that would mean that His Essence is a locus for temporal events and subject to change—both of which are impossible.
He (6) replied: “Why should it not be possible for Allah to be All-Hearing and All-Seeing by an eternal hearing and an eternal sight, with that hearing and sight (7) attaching to what is seen and heard only on the condition that those things are present and existent? (8)”
He (9) then said: “And this is (10) precisely what our companions mean when they speak of hearing and sight: