for that; therefore, there must be some proof that establishes the impossibility of vacancy thereafter so that the earlier state may be joined to it. Yet you possess no consensus safeguarded from error, for such a consensus would have to be that of all believers, and it is quite possible for a faction of the dialecticians to agree upon a mistake, since the greater part of the ummah judges them all to be wrong in much (1) of what they say. Moreover, one cannot pretend that there is no disagreement over this question—though it is not our purpose to debate him on that point.

What matters to us is his statement in the second subtle point (2):

“The indication that contingent events cannot inhere in the Essence of the Lord—glorified be He—is that, were they to inhere in Him, He would never be rid of them, and that would entail His being originated (3). Thus, if the opponent allows that a substance may be free of contingent events while still being, in principle, receptive to them, no argument then remains for the impossibility of the Creator’s accepting contingent events.”

It is said to you: you have also stated earlier (4) that, on their own principles, the Muʿtazila cannot coherently agree that contingent events do not inhere in the Divine Essence, while at the same time permitting substances to be devoid of accidents and affirming the continual renewal of the Lord’s—blessed and exalted—judgments. As for you and your companions, you have produced no proof that it is impossible for substances to be empty of every kind of accident; you have advanced no argument that whatever is receptive to a thing cannot be devoid of it and of its opposite; and you have offered no demonstration for the impossibility of contingent events inhering in Him. Rather, in the question of contingent events you have made