his argument for the origination of the world is completed by means of the akwān (modes) (1). This, however, is no more than a rebuttal of those who allow that the substance might be empty of modes, and he has noted that the Basrans do not differ with him on this point. He therefore pressed them with two purely dialectical arguments, neither of which constitutes a demonstrative proof.
The first of these (2) builds on their concession that vacancy is impossible once an accident has in-hered; he treated the two situations as identical and said: “If it is possible for the substance to be devoid of both opposites before an accident occurs, it is possible afterwards as well.”
It may be said to him: If this equating is invalid, the distinction remains and your claim falls; but if it is sound, one of two consequences must follow—either vacancy is permissible both before and after, or it is impossible both before and after. Neither option is entailed in particular. Moreover, the opponent’s agreement with you on the impossibility of vacancy after (3) yields you no certain knowledge, for neither you nor he possesses any proof.
(1) I say: Sheikh al-Islam, may Allah have mercy on him, clarifies in Dar’ Ta’arudh al-‘Aql wa al-Naql (Refutation of the Contradiction between Reason and Revelation, vol. 2, p. 191) that the affirmation of existents in terms of motion and rest is inescapable, since any enduring body must either move or remain at rest. As for conjunction and separation, these depend on affirming the individual substance; he notes that this is a well-known subject of extensive debate.
(2) This is one of the two points al-Juwayni invokes against the Muʿtazilites, citing the consensus on the impossibility of accidents returning once actualized. Sheikh al-Islam, may Allah have mercy on him, elucidates in Dar’ Ta’arudh al-‘Aql wa al-Naql (vol. 2, p. 192) that the essence of this argument is an analogy between post-qualification and pre-qualification. His opponents replied that the difference lies in the fact that a quality cannot cease except by the emergence of its opposite, so neither can be entirely absent. If this distinction holds, the analogy fails; if not, the ruling is fundamentally precluded. Moreover, some permitted absence after qualification when the opposite can vanish without another quality arising. The example of blackness and whiteness is a particular case and does not establish a universal rule. One cannot assume that every taste in bodies, when it disappears, must be replaced by another taste, nor every smell by another smell; the same applies to volition, aversion, and the like.
(3) The material enclosed in parentheses is an addition by S. and T.