and this is precisely what you believe when you insist that letters must be originated, as you have stated here. Yet the same proof applies with even greater force to meanings.

Suppose, then, you were to say: We can conceive of letters (1) aggregated—or of sounds (2) aggregated—within a single locus, on the strength of the evidence that points to this; for that One has no parts such that what subsists in one part would differ from what subsists in another. Since no real differentiation is required in what subsists in Him, there is no obstacle to the subsistence of a single sound which, in relation to something else, would be counted as multiple sounds. Difference arises only from differentiation, and where there is no differentiation, difference is impossible. Thus, if what subsists in Him is undifferentiated, then (3) it is all the more evident that it cannot be different. To posit (4) the subsistence of two distinct sounds in Him under these conditions is therefore impossible on the very principles you have laid down.

Fifty-seventh Point:

For us, the concurrence in a single subject at a single moment of knowledge of a thing together with actually seeing it is impossible, and likewise the concurrence of knowledge of it and hearing it. Yet you affirm that the Creator both knows all existents and sees them, with knowledge and vision subsisting in one and the same subject. Moreover, according to al-Ashʿarī, al-Qāḍī, and the rest of your leading authorities, the Face, the two Hands, and the other attributes all subsist in the indivisible Essence of Allah just as knowledge, hearing, sight, and power do.

It is well known that, for us, the simultaneous subsistence of power and the two Hands in one locus is impossible; indeed, we hold that the Hands are themselves the locus of power. If, then, you affirm a Hand and a Face and describe them as such, what prevents you from affirming letters and sounds as well? You could even say: