speech a single meaning; yet you maintain that this one meaning actually comprises diverse realities—command, prohibition, report, and inquiry. Still, you did not claim that command, prohibition, report, and inquiry are attributes inhering in speech in the same way that attributes inhere in the Speaker, nor can you say so; for an attribute cannot inhere in another attribute—both of them inhere only in the One described. Had you said that, command, prohibition, and report would have become distinct attributes subsisting in Allah, and that is precisely what you have fled (1) from.
Yet this accords with the view of those who say that speech consists of attributes, whereas with respect to the One Lord you did not assert (2) that He is, in His very Self, two entities; rather, you declared that He possesses neither parts nor components. By the same token, you ought to say that speech, too, has no parts or components and that, moreover, it is not a set of disparate realities, so that in itself it is neither command, nor report, nor inquiry—just as you affirm the same concerning (3) the One described.
Perhaps this is what Ibn Kullab observed—being earlier and more adept than al-Ashʿari—for he did not characterize the eternal speech as command, prohibition, report, or inquiry, but deemed these to be relational matters that merely arise (4) with it. This is closer to reason and more consistent with their own principles than al-Ashʿari’s position, which is unsound.
Thus, while in your view the Described is one in the sense that He has no parts and is not, for you, a composite of multiple realities but rather is characterized by attributes, you nonetheless go on to say (5): speech is a single, partless meaning, yet it is at the same time a plurality of realities—command