and His hearing of Zayd’s speech is the very same as His hearing of ʿAmr’s speech, with no change or variation whatsoever in any of His essential attributes and qualities.”

He also said (1): “If it is asked: How can a single discourse encompass different properties (2) so that it is at once a command, a prohibition, a declarative statement, an interrogative, a promise, and a threat? The answer is that this is grasped through the proof that establishes its pre-eternity and prevents it from being changeable or diverse, unlike the speech of originated beings—just as it is intelligible that a speaker may be one single entity, possessing no limbs, parts, or instruments. What necessitates His being so is His pre-eternity, and thus it follows (3) that He must differ from the speakers who are created, even though among created things it is inconceivable (4) for a speaker to be (5) a single, indivisible entity.”

It is said to him: This (6) is no answer to the question, for the inquirer asked: How can something that is one and admits of no differentiation nevertheless be different? This is like the Christians’ claim that one essence is three essences. What you have presented is merely an attempt to furnish evidence for the truth of your assertion; it is not a reply to the objection. Such is the habitual practice of Ibn Furak and his companions, for when he was debated (7) in the presence of Maḥmūd b