the mind, whether expressed in Arabic or in another language, and for this very reason Ibn Kullab and al-Ashʿarī (1) argued over these very designations—“command,” “prohibition,” and “address.” Does each come into existence only when the addressee himself comes into existence, as Ibn Kullab asserted, or are they eternal, as al-Ashʿarī held?
It may therefore be said to you:
Exactly the same point applies to the attributes of knowledge, power, speech, hearing, and sight. Why did you not deem all of these attributes to be a single reality and treat their distinctive features as mere relational accidents attaching to it? Indeed, regarding hearing and sight as a specific type of knowledge is far more intelligible than claiming that the very reality of every report is identical to the reality of every command and that all reports share one single essence. They themselves have addressed this problem, for al-Rāzī (2) states:
Chapter Three (3): It is impermissible to hold that Allah is described by only one attribute.
(1) In Al-Irshād, pp. 119–120, al-Juwaynī outlines this disagreement and approves the view of his teacher Abu al-Ḥasan: “ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿīd b. Kilāb—may God have mercy on him—among our companions, held that the eternal speech (kalām al-azalī) does not bear the attributes of command, prohibition, or report except when the addressees exist and fulfill the conditions required of those commanded or forbidden. Thus, when God creates the servants and conveys His speech as a directive, a forbidding, or a report, it then acquires these rulings, which are among the attributes of His actions—analogous to the enduring attributes by which the Exalted is ever Creator, Provider, Benefactor, and Bestower. Although this approach may prevent confusion, it is not satisfactory. The correct position, as our Shaykh—may God be pleased with him—affirmed, is that the eternal speech has always been characterized by command, prohibition, and report; that which is nonexistent in itself is commanded by the eternal command, assuming existence; and that the divine command is ancient in itself by virtue of its necessity for what will be when they exist. What they objected to—namely, the impossibility of commanding what is nonexistent—is no real obstacle.” See this dispute also in: Ghāyat al-Murām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām by al-Āmidī, p. 104; Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām by al-Shahrastānī, pp. 303–304; Uṣūl al-Dīn by al-Baghdādī, p. 108.
(2) In Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl fī Dirāyat al-Uṣūl (manuscript), folio 156.
(3) In the second edition. It is an error.