(1) In his Kitāb Muḥaṣṣil Afkār al-Muqaddimīn wa-al-Muta’akhkhirīn (p. 174), al-Rāzī states: “As for the view held by our people, it is not unanimously agreed upon; in fact, no one besides our people has espoused it.” See also: Ghayat al-Marām fī ‘Ilm al-Kalām by al-ʿĀmidī, pp. 88–89; Nihāyat al-Iqdām by al-Shahrastānī, p. 313. (2) The Ashʿarites maintain that the speech of Allah Most High is a single meaning—just like ‘ilm (knowledge), qudrah (power), and the other attributes—and that its division into command and prohibition represents only attributes of speech, not separate parts of it. They bring what they claim are rational proofs, which sound reason does not accept; indeed, it confirms the opposite—and they follow intricate methods to establish and defend their position. To help the reader follow our discussion, we quote Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī in his Al-Irshād (p. 136), where he devotes a chapter to this issue: “The speech of Allah Most High is one, and it pertains equally to all its instances. Likewise for His other attributes: He knows every fact by one knowledge, and He is able to accomplish all things by one power—similarly for hayah (life), sama‘ (hearing), baṣar (sight), and irādah (will). As for qada’ (decree), the unity of the attributes is not within the grasp of rational demonstration but is established by the Law and demands assent. Proof of a single knowledge is contested, and one resorts to rational arguments to affirm it against its deniers—this concerns knowledge alone. As for positing a second, eternal knowledge, no theologian of Islam has affirmed it; hence its negation is unanimously agreed upon and is attributed to the Attribute of Precedence. If someone were to object, saying, ‘What you have said about knowledge and power is manageable for you; on what basis do you apply it to will and speech?’ we reply: ‘Our aim is to clarify the binding consensus on the negation of a second eternal speech, which rests on the foregoing and is free of ambiguity.’” Al-Shahrastānī, in Nihāyat al-Iqdām (pp. 288–289), formulates a principle—his thirteenth—that “The speech of Allah is one.” After outlining the various schools, he adds: “The Ashʿarites say: If the evidence establishes that speech is a meaning inherent in the Essence of the Exalted Creator, and if each of His meanings or attributes is singular, then everything that proves His ‘ilm, qudrah, and irādah to be one likewise proves that His speech is one.” He then presents and critically examines the opposing views in considerable detail.