the hearer it is a definite request and an actual volition, so long as he is unaware of what lies beneath the surface (1). In the same way, the signification of the wording when uttered by a liar is nothing but what he has fabricated; and fabrication (ikhtilāq) means positing—something he conceives in his mind that has no reality whatsoever. The hearer, however, understands the wording to denote the concrete meanings that ought to be intended by it.
Twenty-Fifth Consideration:
We say to them: You yourselves have established in the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) (2) that a well-known word, in constant use among both elite and common folk, cannot legitimately be assigned to some subtle meaning apprehended only by a select few. This is correct, because when people speak using a word that bears a meaning, their very speech indicates their shared comprehension of that meaning, whether as speakers or as listeners. If the meaning in question could be understood only by certain people after painstaking reflection, it would be impossible for that meaning to have been the intention of the word, since both layman and specialist grasp the word’s meaning without such fine analysis. They themselves illustrate this with the term “motion”: is it (3) a name for the body’s being in motion, or for some entity that necessitates the body’s motion? Granted that, it is well known that the clearest of all nouns and the things they denote is the word (4) “speech,” “discourse,” and “utterance,” together with its derivatives such as “command,” “prohibition,” “report,” and “inquiry,” for the most manifest of human attributes is the faculty of speech, as the Exalted has said: “By the Lord of the heaven and the earth, it is surely the truth…”