Al-Tisʿīniyya - Ibn Taimiya - (2/679)

Al-TisʿīniyyaIbn Taimiya

—nor (1) does he retain it, nor (1) does he commit himself to what it entails. The first of these is the believer, while the second is the disbeliever—when the subject is what the Messengers have conveyed from Allah. Not everyone who knows something has, therefore, grasped and embraced it—that is, retained it, held fast to it, and acted upon its implications—just as not everyone who embraces something is necessarily knowledgeable of it. The terms ʿaqd and iʿtiqād (binding, conviction) resemble the terms ʿaql and iʿtiqāl (intellect, confinement); the meaning of each may sometimes coincide with knowledge (2) and sometimes diverge from it. Hence one might imagine that within the soul there is an awareness other than knowledge. Because the words ʿaqd and ʿaql are applied to a person who holds on to knowledge, comprehends it (3), preserves it at times, and acts in accordance with it, they hint that he may occasionally be described by them and at other times by their opposites—that is, by abandoning knowledge and what it necessitates. The same vocabulary may also be used for someone who clings to what is not knowledge (4). For these two reasons it is impossible to ascribe iʿtiqād (belief) to Allah, exalted is He, for He is All-Knowing: His knowledge never departs from Him, and He does not “believe” what is not knowledge. To describe Him with that term would allow the attribution to Him of the opposite of knowledge. Likewise, the words fiqh (understanding) and fahm (comprehension) both presuppose knowledge that is preceded by non-existence, and this is impossible with respect to Allah.

The twenty-fourth argument:
What they have cited to prove that the meaning of command and informative speech is neither knowledge nor will—together with the examples they adduce, such as a command issued merely as a test and the statement of a liar.

We reply: There is no doubt that the lying speaker conceives in his mind something contrary to reality and then reports it with his tongue; yet what he so conceives is only a mental representation of knowledge. When a statement is true and its speaker knows it to be true, its very meaning is knowledge.

(1) The text enclosed in parentheses is an editorial addition for clarity. (2) The base text reads “b-jamia,” which is a scribal error; the correct reading is confirmed by both S and T. (3) The base text reads “fiya’id,” and in S it appears as “fiya’ibuh”—both are incorrect; the editor’s reading is confirmed by T. (4) The base text reads “ya’lam,” a reading attested in S and T.

و [لا] (١) يضبطه و [لا] (١) يلتزم موجبه، فالأول هو المؤمن، والثاني هو الكافر - إذا كان ذلك فيما جاءت به الرسل عن الله ليس كل من علم شيئًا عقله واعتقده، أي: ضبطه وأمسكه والتزم موجبه، كما أنَّه ليس كل من اعتقد شيئًا كان عالمًا به، فلفظ العقد والاعتقاد شبيه بلفظ العقل والاعتقال، ومعنى كل منهما يجامع (٢) العلم تارة، ويفارقه أخرى، فمن هنا قد يتوهم أن في النفس خبرًا غير العلم، ولفظ العقد والعقل لما كان جاريًا على من يمسك العلم فيعيه (٣) ، ويحفظه تارة ويعمل بموجبه كان مشعرًا بأنه يوصف بذلك تارة، وبضده تارة، وهو الخروج عن العلم وعن موجبه، وقد يستعمل اللفظ فيمن يمسك بما ليس بعلم (٤) ، ومن هذين الوجهين امتنع أن يوصف الله بالاعتقاد، فإنه - سبحانه - عالم لا يجوز أن يفارقه علمه، ولا يعتقد ما ليس بعلم، فوصفه به يدل على جواز وصفه بضد العلم، ولفظ الفقه ولفظ الفهم كلاهما يستلزم علمًا مسبوقًا بعدمه، وهذا في حق الله ممتنع. الوجه الرابع والعشرون: أن ما ذكروه في إثبات أن معنى الأمر والخبر ليس هو العلم ولا الإرادة، وما يتبع ذلك من ضرب المثل بأمر الامتحان وخبر الكاذب. يقال في ذلك: لا ريب أن الكاذب المخبر يقدر في نفسه الشيء على خلاف ما هو به، ويخبر به بلسانه، لكن ذلك المقدر هو تقدير العلم، فإن الخبر الصدق الَّذي يعلم صاحبه أنَّه صدق لما كان معناه العلم

(١) ما بين المعقوفتين زيادة من: ط. لتوضيح المعنى. (٢) في الأصل: بجامع. وهو تصحيف. والمثبت من: س، ط. (٣) في الأصل: فيعيد. وفي س: فيعيبه. وهو خطأ. والمثبت من: ط. (٤) في الأصل: يعلم. والمثبت من: س، ط.