cannot be demanded of anyone or imposed as a duty, for (1) such a thing has no reality at all. It therefore becomes evident that their statement—“Denial can occur only from a person who knows (2) something, and only as a verbal expression, not in the heart; for the denier (3)—even though he denies it with his tongue—acknowledges it inwardly, so denial in the heart is impossible”—is more accurate than their other claim that “a knower may still harbour in his heart an inward falsehood that contradicts his knowledge.” If that is so, their entire proof for the existence of the supposed inward assertion beyond knowledge collapses, and that is the very point at issue.

Twentieth aspect:
It may be said that there is no doubt a person can report what he neither knows nor even suspects, and can also report the opposite of what he knows or believes. There is likewise no doubt that such a report embodies a meaning that subsists in the soul over and above mere knowledge. For that reason, one can conceive this meaning before formulating words for it—let alone before actually uttering them. Indeed, whoever intends to speak contrary to his knowledge first conceives and pictures that meaning within himself before giving expression to it. What shows this is that falsehood is a word