with respect to Him (1); hence it becomes clear that, in the very midst of their contradictions, they have established neither the inward speech (2) nor its truthfulness, so they have proved neither of the two contradictories.
If it is said, “How can a matter be devoid of both contradictories, and how can both of them be removed?” we reply: This is impossible in established realities (3); yet it can occur within hypothetical impossibilities, for whoever posits an impossible assumption is thereby committed to both the conjunction and the negation of the two contradictories (4). That is absurd, because it is the inevitable consequence of the impossibility he has postulated.
This leads to another proof, namely:
The Eighteenth Answer:
They have assigned to the report a meaning that is not knowledge or anything akin to it. This is the affirmation of something impossible, and if its very existence is impossible, then describing it as true or false is likewise impossible (5), for it has no reality at all.
Therefore their later statement, “knowledge necessarily entails truthfulness and negates falsehood,” even though it contradicts their earlier statement that “knowledge does not entail truthfulness nor negate falsehood,”—both of these contradictory assertions are null, for each of them (6) rests on the assumption that the report possesses a meaning other than knowledge and its cognates. Since that assumption is false and impossible, whatever negation or affirmation issues from it may also be false. The upshot is an obligation to affirm the [ijtimaʿ] (concurrence) (7) of the two contradictories and, at the same time, their absence (8) under this supposition. These implications point to the falsity of the alleged subject, namely a meaning for the report other than knowledge and the like.