and have advanced other proofs for the reality of Allah’s speech, relying solely on the statements of the messengers.

He further says, “The aḥkām are among the foremost proofs for the establishment of command and prohibition.” One may reply: Are the aḥkām, in your view, anything other than command and prohibition such that (1) one of the two could be used as evidence for the other? Or is the word aḥkām more prominent in the discourse of the messengers and of those who believe in them than the words command and prohibition?

Even more astonishing is his statement that the very imposition of taklīf upon the servants is proof of Allah’s speech and of the permissibility of sending messengers. For if, according to him, taklīf is established only through the messengers, then knowledge of the permissibility of sending messengers must precede knowledge (2) of taklīf. How, then, can what is learned later be used as proof for what is known earlier? By rights, knowledge of the proof must come before knowledge of that which it proves, since it has been designated as evidence for it. And even if it were assumed that he allows for purely rational taklīf, that position, according to its proponents, reverts to attributes inhering in actions and therefore does not require the affirmation of speech.

Our purpose here is not to elaborate on that point. Rather, what concerns us is their statement: “The occurrence of taklīf points to His knowledge, and His knowledge points to the reality of truthful speech (3), for whoever knows something is never without an inner utterance concerning what he knows; that inner utterance is governance and information.” Thus they have deemed knowledge to entail speech in its two forms: truthful report (4) and governance, which is a demand. This is closer to the truth than the other view. If that is the case, how can one even conceive of knowledge coexisting with an inward falsehood?

If it is said: There is no doubt that this is a contradiction on their part regarding one and the same specific matter—at one time affirming it and regarding it as actual speech, and at another time denying it and denying that it be called actual speech, assuming its existence—yet contradiction only shows that one of the two conflicting claims is false.