—namely, their departure from the position of the Salaf, the leading Imams, and the scholars of hadith concerning faith, even though they were fully aware of it because of the difficulty created for them by the sophistries of the Jahmiyyah-Murjiʾah.⦗1⦘
Our aim, rather, is to clarify what al-Isfarāyīnī stated: that affirmation (tasdīq) is realized only through knowledge and acknowledgment. Even though by “knowledge” he meant what he himself had laid down in his theoretical principles, he did not relate that to the fundamentals of faith brought by the Messenger. Accordingly, if affirmation can be achieved only through knowledge and—additionally—through verbal confession,⦗2⦘ their own words indicate that affirmation in the heart cannot exist or be complete without confession by the tongue. This, however, contradicts their claim that speech is nothing but what subsists in the soul.
This is a clear contradiction: if the heart’s affirmation is realized without utterance, the former assertion is invalid; but if it is realized only through utterance—or something that takes its place—then the latter assertion is invalid. Such are their own statements.
What follows is that they did not content themselves with saying that knowledge is incompatible with internal falsehood; they went further and claimed that it positively necessitates internal truthfulness, so that knowledge cannot exist without truth. This demolishes the very basis on which they posited an “inner report,” namely, that it could subsist without knowledge and even contrary to knowledge—that is, as a lie. Just as they employed knowledge to deny the possibility of internal lying and to establish internal truth, they also used it to argue for the very existence of “inner speech.”
Abū al-Qāsim al-Naysābūrī said:
“Among the points cited by al-Ustādh Abū Isḥāq—meaning, in order to prove the ‘inner speech of Allah’ that they uphold—is his statement: ‘Legal rulings do not attach to the attributes of actions, nor to the actions themselves; rather, they attach to the word of Allah. This is among the clearest proofs for the reality of command and prohibition, promise and threat; for the very imposition of obligation upon the servants is evidence of Allah’s speech, and the permissibility of sending messengers…’”