(1) The Ashʿarites distinguish between maʿrifah (cognition) and taṣdīq (affirmation) so that their position on the reality of faith—namely, taṣdīq—is not mistaken for that of the Jahmiyyah. Evidence for this is what Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī says in Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid (vol. 2, pp. 250–251): “‘The doctrine is that it (i.e. taṣdīq) is different from ʿilm (knowledge) and maʿrifah, for among the disbelievers are those who know the truth yet refuse to affirm it out of obstinacy and arrogance. Allah says: ‘Those to whom We have given the Book recognize it as they recognize their own sons, yet indeed some of them conceal the truth even though they know it’ (al-Baqarah 2:146). And He says: ‘And those who were given the Scripture know that it is the truth from their Lord; and Allah is not unaware of what they do’ (al-Baqarah 2:144). And He says: ‘Yet they deny it while their own selves bear witness that it is the truth, out of injustice and arrogance…’ (an-Naml 27:14). And He relates, in the account of Moses (peace be upon him) to Pharaoh: ‘You already know that what these [people] have revealed is the truth from the Lord of the heavens and the earth, clear proofs’ (al-Isrāʾ 17:102). “‘Thus there was a need to distinguish between ‘knowledge’ of what the Prophet (peace be upon him) brought—i.e. maʿrifah—and taṣdīq, so that the former may be attained even by the obstinate while the latter may not; and so that taṣdīq alone is deemed faith, apart from maʿrifah. Some limited the opposite of taṣdīq to denial (inkār) and outright rejection (takdhīb), and the opposite of maʿrifah to neglect (nakārah) and ignorance (jahl). Al-Ghazālī (may Allah have mercy on him) alludes to this distinction when he defines taṣdīq as taslīm (submission), since affirmation cannot coexist with denial and arrogance, unlike mere knowledge and cognition. ’ Some of the later Ashʿarites elaborated further: they said that taṣdīq is the heart’s binding itself to what the informant has conveyed, an acquired act that depends on the believer’s choice; hence one is commanded and rewarded for it—and indeed it is considered the chief of acts of worship—whereas maʿrifah may occur without effort or choice, for example when the eye falls upon an object and one comes to know that it is a wall or a stone. Thus, as noted, the Ashʿarites make a clear distinction: they regard maʿrifah as the opposite of neglect and ignorance, necessarily present even among obstinate deniers such as Iblīs and Pharaoh—arising unavoidably, without choice—whereas taṣdīq is the opposite of denial and rejection, not attained by the obstinate, but achieved through effort and volition. And Shaykh al-Islām (may Allah have mercy on him), I believe, does not favor such a distinction; he describes it as a subtle matter that most sound intellects reject. He says (may Allah have mercy on him) in his book al-Īmān (p. 340): “‘…And the difference between the heart’s knowledge and mere affirmation of the heart devoid of submission—which would render the heart’s statement a subtle matter that most intellects deny—and even if one were to concede its validity, one would not require everyone to affirm two things whose distinction cannot be conceived, and most people…’”