[Lacuna:] He said (1): Among the proofs adduced by the Master Abū Isḥāq and the Judge Abū Bakr (2) and others is their statement that the eternal speech is that declaration which—were it false—would contradict the knowledge of it, for it is incumbent upon one who knows something to convey information about the known in the very manner in which it is known to him. The same applies to the speech subsisting within the self as a testimony (3) (4)—that which is called tadbīr or the inner discourse—for it is inseparable from knowledge.

He said (5): If it is objected, “Had knowledge precluded falsehood, it would be impossible for any one of us to lie by way of juhūd (denial); yet such lying is clearly imaginable and conceivable,” (6) (7)

we reply: Denial is only conceivable from someone who knows the matter when he articulates it with the tongue (8) while not with the heart; the person who denies it verbally is inwardly acknowledging it, so true denial of the heart is impossible for him.

If they then say, “It is not impossible to imagine denial in the heart together with knowledge remaining in the soul at the same time,” (9)

we answer: Were what you imagine actually conceivable, it would not constitute speech at all