—that the meaning of a report is the mental judgment which only they, to the exclusion of all other rational thinkers, affirm (1). As for Abū al-Maʿālī and those of his school, they cited no proof for affirming kalām nafsānī (inner speech) except the evidence they thought established the existence of ṭalab—a demand or command—they alleged to be distinct (2) from will (irādah). If that evidence proves anything, it shows only that the meaning of a command differs from will; it does not prove (3) that the meaning of a report differs from knowledge. He merely argued for the existence of an inner assent (taṣdīq nafsānī) on the grounds that it is what the miracle indicates, without demonstrating that it is other than knowledge.
It may therefore be said to them:
You yourselves expressly affirm the contrary—namely, that it is impossible for a mental judgment to stand opposed to knowledge, and that even if its existence were conceded it would not, in strict truth, constitute speech. Hence, when you deny (4) the existence of this mental judgment that conflicts with knowledge, or its being
(1) al-Rāzī mentions in al-Mahsūl fī ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh, vol.2/1:307–314, the various opinions on the definition of khabar (report), which he refutes as poor and invalid. Then on pp.315–316 he states: “Once this is established, we say: if by khabar one means a mental judgment, there is no doubt that its conception—generally—is self-evident, firmly rooted in the nature of the intellect. And if it refers to the word denoting the mahiyya (essence), the difficulty likewise does not arise, since any utterance conveying a self-evident concept will itself be self-evident.”
(2) In the original: read “call it mughayir (differing).” In his al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (1:200–201), Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī states: “We say: a commander feels within himself an urging and a demand for what is commanded, and the phrasing that expresses it points to this—this is the meaning of kalām al-nafs (the soul’s discourse). If one asks: Is what you call ‘urging’ simply the will to obey the command? We reply: a commander may order another and the commanded person inevitably perceives this urging by necessary inference from the circumstances, even though the commander may intend the commanded to act against him for a certain purpose.”
(3) In the original: “la dal.”
(4) In the original: read “taqsim.”