As for the second reply, we say to him: Once it has been shown that the meaning of a command (amr) in the perceptible realm is but a form of will (irādah), then that is its very essence, and essences do not change between what is seen and what is unseen. Whether this attribute is identical with that one, entails it, or is something other than it (1) can only be known in the same way we come to know things in the observable world (2).

The fourteenth argument: A prohibition (nahy) necessarily implies dislike (3) for the act that is prohibited, just as a command necessarily implies love for the act that is commanded. What is disliked cannot simultaneously be willed; therefore, the will that is negated (4) with respect to the occurrence of a disliked act must be different from the will connected to its actual existence. He presented this objection to him in the debate over the divine will regarding existing events, and the only answer he offered was: “We do not concede that it is disliked; rather, it is merely prohibited.” It is clear that this answer contradicts the consensus (5) of the Muslims—indeed, what is (6) known by necessity in the religion—and it conflicts with what he himself affirmed in the principles of jurisprudence (7). Allah the Exalted says, “All of that—its evil is detested by your Lord.” (8)

The fifteenth argument: Certain groups say to them, “Why may the meaning of a report not simply be knowledge, especially since many people hold that the meaning of speech ultimately reduces to…"