yet he himself maintained that this very issue belongs to that category (1). And if (2) two distinct questions were each contested on two positions, may those who come later adopt the stance of one faction in one question while taking the stance of another faction in the other, on the pretext that introducing a third view in the first is forbidden (3)?
There are two answers:
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Some say the matter requires further detail. If (4) the legal basis of the two questions is identical (5), no differentiation is allowed; otherwise, it is permitted.
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Others say that if the scholars whose consensus is cited have expressly declared the two questions equivalent, then no distinction is permissible; if they have not, it is permissible (6).
Accordingly, this issue falls under that very category (7), for the debate over Divine speech comprises several questions, each independent of the others.
The first: Does speech subsist in Him or not?
The second: Is speech the very letters and sounds, the intangible meanings, or a combination of the two?
The third: If it does subsist in Him (8), must it be eternally inherent, or does He speak whenever He wills?
The fourth: Are those meanings of the same genus as knowledge and will, or of a genus altogether different?