the scholars of ḥadīth and the jurists, together with certain schools of kalām such as the Murjiʾah, the Shiʿah, the Karrāmiyyah, and others. Yet it is not permissible (1) to pronounce it eternal without evidence—no more permissible than the assertion made by some of the leading Sunnis who say, “Allah has never ceased to be One who speaks whenever He wills,” meaning that He has never ceased to be characterized as One who speaks whenever He wills—while he himself does not subscribe to that view (2).
Thus the very premise he has established refutes both the Muʿtazilite position and that of his own followers, and his appeal to the concurrence of those two factions is of no avail, for such concurrence is not the consensus of the Ummah.
Eighth Aspect: When he set the consensus he claimed against another form of consensus—namely, that no member of the Ummah has affirmed the pre-eternity of Allah’s speech by the method you have proposed—it follows that relying on your method would in fact breach consensus.
He replied: “We have explained in the book al-Maḥṣūl (3) that introducing a proof not cited by the people of consensus does not constitute a violation of consensus.”
It may be said to him: That holds true (4) only if one adduces an additional argument alongside the proof upon which the people of consensus relied, for that would not imply declaring them mistaken. But if the foundation and the evidence on which the people of consensus relied have been invalidated, and one then puts forward a different proof (5), this would indeed amount to declaring the people of consensus in error (6). Such is precisely the case here, because those who affirmed its pre-eternity did so only