issue, for this matter is one established by revelation (1), as he himself has acknowledged; he affirms it solely on the basis of the mutawātir (mass-transmitted) reports from the prophets—peace be upon them—that Allah speaks.
Hence, when his opponent said to him, “It is invalid to prove that He is a Speaker who commands, forbids, and informs by consensus, for the very meaning of speech is disputed,” he replied, “We establish this through the mutawātir reports from the prophets—peace be upon them—for they used to say, ‘Allah commanded such-and-such, forbade such-and-such, informed of such-and-such, said such-and-such, and spoke such-and-such.’ And we (2) also affirm it by consensus, as he (3) has explained.”
Now, if the foundation of the question (4) is to reason from mass-transmitted reports and consensus that Allah is a Speaker who commands and forbids, then determining what “Speaker, Commander, Prohibitor” actually means becomes indispensable: Is it the One in whom speech—command, prohibition, and information—truly inheres, or the One who merely brings it into existence, even (5) in something other than Himself? This forms one of the two premises of the proof, without which the argument is incomplete. For if it were admissible to say that the utterer, commander, forbider, and informer has no speech, no command, no prohibition, and no information inhering in Him, the evidential basis of the affirmers would be nullified from every angle.
Accordingly, an exhaustive treatment of this foundational point is the most important aspect of the entire discussion; indeed, there is no principle within it more critical. It was precisely on this basis that the leading scholars declared the Jahmiyyah unbelievers, because they knew that a Speaker is the one in whom speech resides, and that this is necessarily known from revelation, reason, and language alike, both to the elite and to the common folk (6). Thus, contrary to his claim, this is not merely a linguistic inquiry; it is an intellectual, substantive, and sharʿi investigation—even while it is, at the same time, a linguistic one, as we shall set forth in: