First (1), the question becomes extremely intricate (2), because (3) the existence of every thing is identical with its very essence. Hence, if the essence of an imperative (ṭalab) differs from that of an informative statement (khabar), then the existence of the imperative must likewise differ from the existence of the statement; for if the two were to share a single existence while differing in essence, existence would be something other than essence, and that would necessitate affirming aḥwāl (non-existent attributes).
Objection: It may be said, “We do not concede that speech, whether informative or imperative, comprises distinct essences (4). Rather, the true nature of speech is the informative statement alone. Do you not see that when someone requests another to perform or refrain from an act, he is in fact informing him that, were he not to comply, he would be punished, or that it is incumbent upon the rational person to comply? Likewise, when one poses a question, he is informing that he seeks to be made to understand. Once all speech is reduced to information, the difficulty vanishes (5).”
We reply: That is not the case
“...and not by nonexistence.” That is, the intermediary between existence and nonexistence. This ḥāl (state) was affirmed by Imam al-Haramayn and al-Baqillānī of the Ashʿarī school, and by Abū Hāshim and his Muʿtazilī followers, while other mutakallimīn rejected it. For details on the positions of those who affirm the states (al-aḥwāl) and those who deny them, see:
Al-Irshād (al-Juwaynī), pp. 80–84.
Muḥaṣṣal Afkār al-Mutaqaddimīn wal-Muta’akhkhirīn (al-Rāzī), pp. 60–61.
Ghayat al-Marām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām (al-Āmidī), pp. 27–37.
Al-Tamhīd (al-Baqillānī), pp. 200–202.
(1) In the original it reads al-kalām (“speech”), a scribal slip; corrected in manuscripts S, T, and in Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl.
(2) All copies read ḍaʿifat (“it was weakened”), apparently a scribal error; corrected in Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl.
(3) In S it reads al-ān (“now”).
(4) Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl reads lā nusallim kūn (“we do not concede [its] existence”).
(5) After the word al-ishkāl (“the objection”), Nihāyat al-ʿUqūl adds the following:
"Then, even if we concede that these matters differ in their realities, we do not concede that one and the same thing cannot be simultaneously a report (khabar) and a request (talab). Its proof is this: if a person says to one of his servants, ‘Whenever I utter this phrase, know that I am commanding you to desist,’ and to another, ‘Whenever I say “Do it,” know that I am commanding you to act,’ and to another, ‘Whenever I utter this phrase, know that I am informing you that the world is created,’ then if they all assemble for one matter and he addresses them all at once with that phrase, that single utterance is at once an order, a prohibition, and a report. If one apprehends that in the immediate context, let him assert the same about what is absent; for that is our position."