He then set forth nine (1) objections advanced by the opponent—some rooted in reason, others in transmitted proof—and said (2) in reply:
“His statement: ‘We concede that Allah’s informative speech is evidence (3) that Allah has judged the attribution (4) of one matter to another; yet why could that judgment not simply be knowledge?’—our answer is that this is untenable for two reasons.
First: the discussants in this question (5) fall into only two camps. One camp affirms for Allah—exalted is He—an eternal informative speech and holds that it is distinct from knowledge; the other camp denies that He possesses any eternal informative speech whatsoever. If we were to say that Allah does have eternal informative speech (6) and then claim that it is identical to knowledge, we would be violating the consensus.
Second: we demonstrated at the very outset of the proof that, in the realm we witness, the benefit of informative speech is not conjecture, knowledge (7), or belief; and once this has been ruled out in what is witnessed (8), it must likewise be ruled out in what is unseen (9), for the consensus is that the benefit of informative speech does not vary between the witnessed and the unseen.”