—in his view—necessarily entails (1) that the attribute of iḥsān (beneficence) (2) alone be affirmed on that basis.
As for the rest of those who uphold positive affirmation—scholars of ḥadīth, jurisprudence, taṣawwuf, and kalām, whether Murjiʾites, Shiʿites, Karramites, or others—they argue that acts subsist in the Lord Himself. Consequently He is described by those acts, in accord with (3) the principle already stated: the agent is the one in whom the act subsists; thus the just and the beneficent are those in whom justice and beneficence subsist, as we indicated earlier. On this foundation (4) the Qāḍī (5), Abū al-Ḥasan ibn al-Zāghūnī, and others replied to the Muʿtazilites, and their answer (6) is a good one (7).
They then differed among themselves over another point: Does whatever subsists in Him have to remain wholly unrelated to His will and power? The Qāḍī, Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and others held fast to their principle that no temporal events can subsist in Him. Yet their interpretation of “maker” and “scribe” as merely “knower” does not sit well with that principle; for if it were allowable to reinterpret (8) actions as knowledge, the same could be done across the board and the principle would collapse. Rather, writing and craftsmanship (9) are acts that subsist in Him, even though they entail knowledge. Must such acts be eternal, having no link to His will and power, or may some of them indeed be connected