their whims were scattered in every direction, (1) their statements became confused, and he then set out their disagreements in detail. Likewise, he says in al-Ibānah (2):
Section (3):
‘The Jahmiyyah claim that Allah possesses neither knowledge, nor power, nor life, nor hearing, nor sight. In reality they wish to deny that Allah is Knowing, Powerful, Living, Hearing, and Seeing, but fear of the sword keeps them from stating this openly, so they express it by implication. For when they say, “Allah has no knowledge and no power,” they have in effect declared that He is not Knowing and not Powerful, and the same necessarily applies to the remaining attributes. They have taken this view from the atheists (ahl al-zandaqah) and the negators (taʿṭīl), for many atheists have said that Allah is neither knowing, nor powerful, nor living, nor hearing, nor seeing. The Muʿtazilah, however, were unable (4) to voice this explicitly, so they conveyed its meaning instead, asserting that Allah is Knowing, Powerful, Living, Hearing, and Seeing only in name, without affirming for Him the true realities of knowledge, power, hearing, or sight.’
Our purpose is to point out—on the basis of what is firmly established by both reason and revelation—that any being who is living, knowing, powerful, speaking, and willing must necessarily possess life, [knowledge] (5), power, speech, and will; and (6) that whatever possesses these qualities rightfully merits the descriptions Living, Knowing, Powerful, Speaking, and Willing. From this follow four matters: the judgment of an attribute is affirmed for the subject in which it inheres; it is denied of any subject in which it does not inhere; the derivative name formed from that attribute is affirmed for the proper subject; and the name is denied (7) of any subject in which the attribute does not inhere.