or through wisdom, mercy, speech, and will that inhere in something other than himself. (9)
Likewise, it is self-evident (1) to sound intellects that speech, will, knowledge, and power can subsist only in a locus, for these attributes (2) do not subsist on their own. It is equally self-evident (3) to rational minds that the locus in which (4) knowledge inheres is thereby knowing, the one in which power inheres is thereby powerful, the one in which speech inheres is thereby speaking, the one in which mercy inheres is thereby merciful, and the one in which will inheres is thereby willing. These truths are firmly rooted (5) in human nature; people’s hearts grasp them with an innate, necessary awareness. The words that convey these meanings belong to the shared languages of the children of Adam: they never call anyone knowing or able unless knowledge and power inhere in him, and whenever knowledge and power inhere in someone they call him knowing and able.
This is what the affirmers (ahl al-ithbāt) mean when they say: if an attribute subsists (6) in a locus, its ruling reverts to that [locus alone; i.e., if knowledge and speech subsist in a locus] (7) then that locus, and no other, is the knowing, the speaking. Likewise, their statement, “If an attribute subsists in a locus, a name is derived for that locus from the attribute,” means that for the locus (8) of knowledge one derives Al-ʿAlīm (the All-Knowing) and for the locus of speech Al-Mutakallim (the Speaking).
Their further saying, “The truth of the derivative is inseparable from the truth of that from which it is derived,” means that the words “All-Knowing” and “Speaking” are derived from “knowledge” and “speech”; therefore, whenever it is affirmed of (9) a subject that he is All-Knowing [or Speaking] (10) …………