They say, “The letters are called ‘speech’ only metaphorically, or by way of (1) linguistic overlap—shared between the letters and the meanings—for even if they are termed ‘speech’ by such overlap (2)” (3). Yet, according to them—and according to the mainstream—speech must inhere in the speaker himself. Hence, by their own definition (4) the letters and sounds can in truth be the speech of human beings, because they subsist in them, whereas they can never truly be the speech of Allah, for in their view nothing of that sort can ever subsist in Him.

If, however, one of them were to say, “The letters that Allah creates in the air are truly called His speech,” or, “What is heard from human reciters or found in the muṣḥafs is truly called the speech of Allah,” he would thereby be compelled (5) to define “speech” as something that does not subsist in the speaker himself but rather serves as an indication of what does subsist in him, even though that indicator is created by him. This is, in fact, what I have found in their writings, and it is a position that could be maintained; but the moment they adopt it, all of the arguments by which they invalidated the Muʿtazilite view fall apart (6), and the Muʿtazilites gain a powerful argument against them (7).

Others report about the earliest members of the group that they showed contempt for the muṣḥafs: they would trample on them, sleep on them (8), place them alongside their sandals, and sometimes even write the Qur’an with filth—deeds characteristic of hypocritical unbelievers. Such behavior is found among the more coarse and extremist elements among them. After their leaders had instilled in them the notion that “this is not the speech of Allah,” they began to derive further conclusions of their own, for which they had received no instruction (9).