one might even say: it is distinction in that respect. Yet many (1) people refuse—or flatly deny—the very terms “distinction” (taghāyur) and “partition” (tabʿīḍ) and the like; some accept the word “distinction” but reject “partition,” while others object to neither term once the meaning has been explained and the ambiguity in the wording removed.

There is no doubt that the Jahmiyyah in this matter advance claims riddled with an obvious, intuitive contradiction; moreover, what they negate (2) is a quality that can belong only to what does not exist, so they both contradict themselves and strip away all attributes. They say: because He is One, it is impossible for Him to possess any attribute whatsoever, for that would entail multiplicity and numerical plurality. They further declare that He must be exalted above any number or multiplicity in His description or His essence (3).

Yet they are then forced to affirm that He is truly eternal, the living, knowing, all-powerful Lord, and similar attributes—meanings of which we may know some while remaining ignorant of others; what is known is not identical to what is unknown, and this entails precisely the plurality, multiplicity, partition, and distinction from which they tried to flee. Such is their contradiction. Furthermore, the absence of all such qualities (4) is true only of what does not exist, whereas anything that does exist is either eternal or originated, either self-subsistent (5) or contingent and in need of another. Indeed, every existent thing is either subsisting by itself or subsisting through something else (6), in addition to other characteristics by which existents (7) are set apart from one another; for every being possesses its own particular reality that distinguishes it, of which something is known while something else remains unknown.