to say that this is a form of distinction (1) in that sense. Many (1) people therefore refuse or deny the very terms “distinction” (taghāyur) and “partition” (tabʿīḍ) and the like; some are willing to use “distinction” but object to “partition”; others object to neither term once the intended meaning is clarified and the ambiguity in the wording removed. There is no doubt that the Jahmiyyah claim the opposite in this matter (2), just as it is said in defining two distinct things: each is that which can exist apart from the other—like the attributes of created bodies, composed of their parts and accidents—for such things can disperse and separate (3). Allah, exalted be He, is far above all of that, sanctified from every imperfection and flaw.
Sometimes what is meant is that something of Him is known while something else is not; in that case, what is known is not other than what remains as yet unknown, even though the latter necessarily accompanies it and never departs from it. Distinction in this sense is affirmed for every existent being: a servant may first know that the True One exists, then learn that He is able, then that He is knowing, and then that He is hearing and seeing. His vision—exalted is He—is like knowledge of Him. Whoever denies of Him and of His attributes this kind of distinction and partition is an outright negator of the Lord, for such distinction is absent only from what does not exist. We have set this out in detail in the book Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah fī Ta'sīs Bidaʿihim al-Kalāmiyyah (4) when discussing Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ and elsewhere, with full clarification. Whoever understands this will have his doubts in this field removed. Hence the statement (5) of the early scholars and leading imams: “Whatever Allah has described of Himself is from Allah; His attributes are from Him; the knowledge of Allah is from Allah and for Him,” and similar expressions in which they employed (6) the preposition min (“from”).
If someone were to say that its meaning (7) is partition, then it is partition only in that particular consideration, just as