(1) al-Shahrastānī notes in al-Milal wa al-Niḥal (2:121–122) that Aristotle holds the Necessary Existent by essence to be simultaneously ‘aql bi-dhātihi (intellect by its own essence), ‘āqil wa-ma‘qūl bi-dhātihi (knower and known by its own essence), an intellect derived from something else, or not intellect at all. He explains: – It is an intellect because it is devoid of matter and free from material limitations, so its essence cannot be veiled even from itself. – It is a knower by essence because it is pure in itself. – It is known by essence because nothing—neither itself nor another—can veil it from itself. Shaykh al-Islām (Ibn Taymiyya) demonstrates that the Peripatetic philosophers conflate these three concepts—intellect, knower, known—into a single reality, thereby identifying the attribute with the attributed. They deny any positive attributes (such as knowledge or power), arguing that to admit them would render God composite of essence and attribute, a position more self-contradictory than that of the Christians and one that negates necessary knowledge. His full refutation suffices to expose its fundamental flaws. See abridged refutation in Dar‘ Taʾarrud al-‘Aql wa al-Naql (Ibn Taymiyya), vol. 5, p. 247; vol. 6, p. 268; Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah (Ibn Taymiyya), vol. 1, p. 1507; and Majmū‘ al-Rasā’il wa al-Masā’il—Kitāb Madhhab al-Salaf al-Qawīm fī Taḥqīq Masʾalat Kalām Allāh al-Karīm (Ibn Taymiyya), vol. 1, sect. 3, p. 373. (2) The printed edition reads al-ʿināyah, whereas the manuscript reads al-ghāyah; the correct reading is probably the one he adopted. This is confirmed by what the Shaykh observes in Majmū‘ al-Rasā’il wa al-Masā’il—Kitāb Madhhab al-Salaf al-Qawīm fī Taḥqīq Masʾalat Kalām Allāh al-Karīm (vol. 1, sect. 3, p. 373), following his earlier discussion of the philosophers’ claim that God is intellect, knower, and known. He states: "They say that God is a perfect cause in eternity, so His effect must be co-eternal with Him in time, even though He precedes it as cause, not in time. They maintain that a perfect cause and its effect are conjoined in time and mutually entail one another: no effect exists without a perfect cause, nor can there be a perfect cause without its effect in time. Yet they admit that the events of the world occurred successively without any renewal from the First Creator that would render Him the cause of successive events. In truth, their doctrine is that events occurred without any Creator and likewise ceased after their occurrence without any cause to account for their cessation, according to their own principle."