was asked, “Tell us about Allah’s knowledge—which, you say, is Allah Himself. Do you claim that it is His power?” He refused (1) to say so. Then, when (2) he was asked, “Is it therefore something other than His power?” he denied that as well.

This is exactly parallel to what he objected to in the statement of his opponents: “One must not say that Allah’s knowledge is Allah, nor that it is other than Him.”

Whenever it was said to him—[If you say that Allah’s knowledge is Allah] (3)—“then say: ‘Allah is knowledge,’” he would fall into self-contradiction, for he would not affirm that “He is knowledge,” even while insisting that “Allah’s knowledge is Allah.”

He said (4): (He used to question anyone who claimed that a thing’s length is identical with the thing itself (5), and likewise its breadth, saying: “Is its length identical with its breadth?”) He said (6): This turns back against him in his own assertion that “Allah’s knowledge is Allah” and that “His power is He,” because if His knowledge is He and His power is He, it necessarily follows that His knowledge is His power; otherwise, a contradiction ensues.

He said (7): Abū al-Hudhayl borrowed this from Aristotle, for Aristotle stated in one of his writings, “The Maker is all knowledge, all power, all life, all sight.” Delighted by the wording, Abū al-Hudhayl declared: “His knowledge is He [and His power is He]” (8).