some rational thinkers might concede, whereas to deny their existence outright is sheer sophistry⦗1⦘ of the same order as denying the very existence of bodies. This opinion, moreover, is upheld by others—such as Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam and the like.

Al-Ashʿarī⦗2⦘ said:

“Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam maintained that motions and all other acts—standing and sitting, willing and loathing, obedience and disobedience, and everything that the affirmers classify as accidents—are attributes of bodies⦗3⦘; they are neither the bodies themselves nor something other than them. They are not bodies upon which differentiation could apply.

He added: It has also been reported from certain early scholars that they spoke as we have just related from Hishām and did not affirm any accidents apart from bodies. It is further reported⦗4⦘ that Hishām did not regard the attributes of a human being as ‘things,’ for in his view ‘things’ are only bodies; rather, he held that they are maʿānī (meanings) and not things.”

I say: Hishām applies the same principle to the attributes of Allah as well: they are neither identical with Him nor other than Him. He carries this rule through for all attributes⦗5⦘, thereby rebutting⦗6⦘ the charge of contradiction⦗7⦘ that the Muʿtazilites used to level against those who affirm the attributes.

He⦗8⦘ also said: “Among those who have taken this stance are Abū al-Hudhayl, Hishām, Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir, and Jaʿfar⦗9⦘ ibn Ḥarb …”