and that He has likewise never ceased to act by His eternal will, nor to be All-Hearing, All-Seeing. They are unanimously agreed that these contingent happenings do not confer upon Allah, exalted is He, any descriptive attribute, nor are they to be counted among His attributes.

Those who dispute this point—the Muʿtazilah and those Ashʿarites and others who follow them—argue as follows: “If a contingent act were to subsist in the Essence (1) of the Eternal, He would necessarily be described by it and the contingent would thereby become His attribute, for there is no meaning to the subsistence of properties in, and their particular attachment to, essences except (2) that they are attributes of those essences (3). Thus, were contingent events—actions, utterances, and volitions—to subsist in the Essence of the Eternal, He would be described by them just as He is described by life, power, knowledge, and will. And were He so described, He would change (4), whereas change is impossible for Him.”

This, however, is nothing more than a verbal disagreement, for calling such things “attributes” and “change” is something the first group does not concede, nor is it supported by the Arabic language. The language does not refer to a man’s standing or sitting as a “change” in him, nor does it unqualifiedly label either as one of his “attributes.” Even if such wording is employed, a merely verbal dispute is harmless so long as it does not oppose the wording of the Sacred Law—and nothing in the Law contradicts this position. Nevertheless, these groups frequently quarrel over vague, equivocal terms. It has been said, “Most disagreements among intelligent people arise from the shared use of names.”

Imam Ahmad (5) described the people of innovation, saying: “They oppose the Book (6); they differ concerning the Book; they are united (7) in abandoning the Book. They speak about Allah, concerning Allah, and regarding the Book of Allah without knowledge, and they speak….”