these so-called rational propositions are, at best, the product of their proponents (1) straining (2) their own minds and personal judgments (3). A statement reached through ijtihād of opinion—even when its author is convinced that it is purely rational, definitive, and admits no contrary—may in fact be anything but definitive, despite his conviction. This is one of the most common occurrences among them: someone will claim that his view is decisively proven by reason, while the reality is otherwise, to the point that the very same person will sometimes assert that a proposition is conclusive and at another time pronounce it false.

When a claim is not decisive, it may be merely conjectural, its soundness or unsoundness unknown; it may be erroneous, its falsity either known or suspected; or it may be altogether doubtful. Thus, most of these disputed assertions whose advocates profess certainty (4) are subject to the following possibilities: lack (5) of certainty, mere conjecture, doubt, surmise that the opposite is true, or even certainty of the opposite. At most, what can be said is that a given statement is known—or thought—to be correct only in the estimation of its proponent (6). Yet not everything that is thus known becomes binding upon all Muslims (7) to believe, for (8) the avenues to such knowledge may be subtle and ambiguous, and therefore it is not obligatory to impose them upon every believer. Even were the matter a clear, self-evident rational proof (9), apparent after the briefest reflection, it would still not necessarily follow that it should, in every such case, be obligatory to