and others as well; they are innocent of this negation and denial, and in matters of affirmation they have statements that every perceptive scholar readily recognizes.

Seventh Argument:
Even if, for the sake of argument, this claim were a truth demonstrable by reason, it would still not be obligatory to believe it on that basis alone, for the obligation to hold a particular belief is established solely by the Sharia and by nothing else.

As for the disputants (1), they themselves concede that all obligation is established only through revealed law, and that reason, even when it apprehends something, imposes no duty.

Those who do maintain (2) that an obligation can sometimes be known by reason limit this to what is recognised as necessary either by self-evident rational intuition or by rational reflection. Holding to a specific formulation concerning the detailed questions of the divine attributes is not something whose obligation is known (3) by either of these means.

Consequently, the vast majority of the imams of Islam agree that anyone who dies believing what the Messenger brought, and to whose mind this particular negation (4) has never occurred (5), is not deserving of punishment; for had it been obligatory, neglecting it would necessarily entail punishment.

If, however, it were claimed that some of the extremist Jahmiyyah among the Muʿtazilah and the like regard knowledge of this negation as an obligation—or even the foremost of obligations—and that anyone, whether scholar or layperson, who fails to hold it is liable to punishment,

or if someone were to assert that this belief is incumbent upon the scholarly elite but not upon the general public, we know with absolute certainty, from the very religion of Islam, that making such a thing obligatory is false; for we know with certitude that the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—his Companions, the Successors, and all