and the proof. If, then, they have instructed people to hold this view merely by imitating them and those who espouse it, such an order is null and void by the unanimous agreement of the Muslims, both within their own ranks and beyond. They themselves concede that imitation is not obligatory in matters of this sort for anyone other than the Messenger, especially since, by their own admission, this claim is not established by the evidences of the Book, the Sunnah, or consensus, but only by rational arguments; and with regard to rational matters imitation is never compulsory by unanimous agreement. (1) Yet if the injunction to adopt this belief is said to rest upon an established proof, they have produced none—neither in concise nor detailed form—nor even referred people to one. Rather, they flee from debate and disputation, whether oral or written. It is therefore established, by consensus of the Muslims, that their command to embrace this creed is prohibited and invalid on both counts; that such behaviour belongs to the practices of the deviant factions of the Ummah; and that it is nothing less than telling people (2) to speak of Allah without knowledge.

Fifth point: Scholars have differed over the permissibility of taqlid in the fundamentals of religion when the person to be followed is one of the Muslim imams whose statements conform to what has been authentically transmitted from the Messengers—just as such imams may be followed in the secondary rulings of the religion.

As for taqlid in the matters they describe as rational, which they claim are known by reason and therefore require interpreting the textual proofs, and which they regard as pillars of the faith, we know of no one who has allowed imitation in such questions. Rather, people fall into two groups: some repudiate these notions outright, showing that they are products of ignorance, not reason, while others say, rather—