and others, nor is it the doctrine of any faction of the Muslim dialectical theologians—neither those who affiliate themselves with the Sunnah, such as the Ashʿariyyah and the Karramiyyah, nor the rest, like the Muʿtazilah, the Shiʿah, and their counterparts. Rather, only a very small group voiced this notion, people who attached themselves to certain Muslim scholars: a few individuals from the Mālikiyyah, the Shāfiʿiyyah, and the Ḥanbalīyyah. The furthest they go is to speak of the ḥulūl (indwelling) of one of Allah’s attributes.

Likewise, those who claim the ḥulūl of the Lord Himself and His ittiḥād (union) with the servant—among the extremist sects that parade under the banners of Shiʿism, Ṣūfism, or anything else—are deviant, just like the Christians. Even so, the Christians have no argument against these people, because what those extremists assert is not unique to the Messiah; they extend it to other prophets and to the righteous as well.

The Christians, for their part, contend that this ittiḥād is the Messiah’s exclusive prerogative. Yet once the divine is said to have united with the nāsūt (human nature), the two supposedly become a single reality, and with such a union it is impossible for either of them to possess an act or an attribute independent of the other. The Christians affirm this union and then contradict themselves: some of them say there is only one jawhar (essence), others say there are two; some insist on one will, others on two wills—as will be discussed in due course, God willing.