then Iblis deserves no censure, and it would be impermissible to employ any ruse to keep him from the justice that is his due; rather, he must be allowed the same power over the later generations as he had over the earlier ones.
But if his action was unjust, why did the Lord not prevent it before the Messiah?
If someone says, “He could not,” they have attributed incapacity to Him; and if they say, “He was able to ward off Iblis’s injustice but chose not to,” then there is no difference between restraining him in one era rather than another. If that is permissible, it is permissible at all times; and if it is impermissible, it is impermissible at all times.
Fourth: If Iblis was excused before the Messiah, there is no need to punish or reproach him; but if he was not excused, he deserves punishment, and there is no need for any contrived stratagem to establish the case against him.
Fifth: Even on the assumption that no conclusive proof had been set up against him before the Crucifixion, the Crucifixion itself did not establish such proof either, for he could say, “I did not know that this human nature was the human nature of the Lord. You, O Lord, gave me permission to seize every descendant of Adam and hurl them into Hell; this man was one of them. I did not know that You—or Your Son—had united with him. Had I known, I would have shown him reverence. Therefore I am excused in this matter, and it is not permissible for You to wrong me.”
Sixth: We may say that Iblis will then say, “O Lord, this….”