indeed, the Romans are even more capable of this than other peoples. On what grounds, then, could anyone claim that Allah could not command them to do so? Moreover, when an obligatory duty cannot be fulfilled without a certain means, and that means lies within a servant’s power, he must employ it—this is unanimously acknowledged by the religious communities of Muslims, Jews, and Christians.

People have differed only over whether such a means should itself be called “obligatory.” Some maintain that it is, while others refuse the label, arguing that the one issuing the command did not explicitly intend that means, and it may never have crossed his mind—assuming, that is, that the command is a created act.

Those who deny the label argue as follows: An obligatory act is one whose neglect incurs legal censure or punishment, or more generally, renders its abandoner deserving of blame or liable to punishment. By contrast, they say, the means without which the duty cannot be completed does not, in itself, expose the person who neglects it to blame or punishment. Thus, if pilgrimage becomes incumbent upon two individuals—one living far away and the other nearby—and both fail to perform it, the punishment for the distant pilgrim is no greater than for the near one, even though the distance he would have had to cover is longer. The same applies to a debtor: someone who can repay what he owes without needing to sell any of his property is not punished any less for defaulting than someone who would have to sell part of his estate in order to settle the debt.

The decisive point is this: whatever an obligation cannot be completed without is an inseparable concomitant of that obligation, and it is impossible for the principal to exist without its concomitant. Therefore, what is commanded cannot be carried out except together with its necessary prerequisites, and what is prohibited cannot be avoided except by refraining from the things that inevitably lead to it. However, this concomitant attaches by reason or by customary practice; accordingly, its obligation is a rational, conventional one—not because the commander