—and most of them were not Arabs—yet Allah sent the revelation down in the Arabic tongue. Hence the very condition of moral responsibility is that people must be able to understand what the Messenger has been sent with. That is secured by sending the message in a language through which his intent is clear. After that, everyone is in a position to know that intent, either by learning the language itself or by learning the meaning of the Book through someone who translates its meaning, and this is within their power. Therefore, if a person cannot grasp the words of the Messenger except by studying the language in which he was sent, that study becomes obligatory for him, for the legal maxim holds: mā lā yatimmu l-wājib illā bihi fa-huwa wājib (“whatever a duty cannot be fulfilled without becomes itself obligatory”). This differs from what is merely needed for the duty’s incumbency to be established (mā lā yatimmu l-wujūb illā bihi); such a thing is not obligatory. Allah does not burden any soul beyond its capacity—neither with respect to the foundation of an obligation nor its completion. Thus we need not invoke the maxim that “whatever a duty cannot be fulfilled without—while lying within the agent’s power—becomes obligatory,” for if something is beyond one’s capacity the servants are not charged with it; indeed, a matter may be within their power and yet they are not commanded to do it.

Because capability is a condition for the obligation of Hajj, acquiring that capability is not itself required—unlike physically covering the distance, which is not a condition. For this reason Hajj is binding upon a person whether he lives far away or nearby, provided he is capable.

The majority of people do not know the meanings of the divine scriptures—the Torah, the Gospel, and the Quran—except through someone who clarifies and explains them, even if they understand the language. Such people are obligated to seek the knowledge by which they come to know what Allah has commanded them and forbidden them, and this