—other than the empirical kind, for within that school some classed intuition as a branch of the empirical sciences, while others treated it as a distinct genus. These theologians contended that such disciplines are narrowly restricted and therefore cannot serve as conclusive proof against anyone unacquainted with them—unlike sensory knowledge, personally-felt experiences, and rational cognition. Yet this is incorrect. Just as those sciences are at times shared and at other times exclusive, so too is sensory perception: every community, in its own age and locale, perceives through its senses conditions of that place and time, and the circumstances of its people, which outsiders do not perceive. The same applies to felt experiences: anyone who is subjected to unusual political or bodily events acquires from them knowledge that no one else shares.

The case is similar with rational cognition: among people there is one who possesses a fundamental principle by which he measures a subsidiary case; he thereby perceives the common element—the middle term—and from its relation to the ruling he grasps what others have not grasped.

Thus, the kinds of knowledge and the paths to them are of two sorts: some are particular, others common. Of the common, some are shared by all humanity, while others are shared only by a specific class or group. This is a comprehensive principle that anyone who speaks on this subject must understand.