When the two sets of evidence and the two opposing oaths cancel each other out, no verdict is issued on the strength of either one alone: the husband is not deemed a slanderer, nor is the wife declared an adulteress.

Yet if she refuses to swear, most jurists maintain that she is judged an adulteress and punished accordingly, as the Quran indicates. For here his sworn testimony is joined to her refusal to counter it—just as, in the case of qasāmah (the homicide-oath procedure), the incriminating sign is coupled with the heirs’ fifty oaths; just as one witness is reinforced by an oath; and just as, on the defendant’s side, the original presumption is strengthened by his oath.

Cases of this sort—and others like them—are established by the Sacred Law, though their detailed treatment lies elsewhere.

The point at hand is this: when supporting evidence proves a report to be true or false, it is judged accordingly; if no such evidence exists, the report remains in limbo—neither confirmed nor denied.

Thus, when the hadith specialists say, “This hadith was transmitted by So-and-so, but he is majrūḥ (discredited), weak, poor of memory, or one whose narration is not accepted,” their statement is like a judge’s remark: “This witness is discredited, of poor memory, or among those whose testimony is inadmissible.” It simply means that no ruling can be based on his report; it is not a declaration that he is a liar. He may in fact be telling the truth, and no one should label him a liar without proof.