and his followers, such as al-Rāzī and others, and they further differed over the question:

“Is it possible for such an act to be brought about at the hands of a liar?”

One answer was: “No, it is impossible, for were it possible its occurrence would have to be conceded.”

A second answer said: “Rather, it lies within the divine power, yet we know He will not do it—just as we know He does not perform many other possible extraordinary acts, such as turning a mountain into ruby or the sea into oil.”

They explained: “We know with self-evident certainty that He will not do these things; hence, the fact that something is possible and within His power does not mean we cannot know that it will not happen. On the contrary, we may know with absolute certitude that it will not occur, even while affirming that it is possible. In our estimation, the appearance of miracles at the hand of someone falsely claiming prophethood belongs to this very category.”

They also said: “A miracle is a sign attesting to the truthfulness of the prophets, so it is inconceivable that the proof should fail to entail the reality for which it stands.”

This statement is correct, yet their opponents reply: “It actually entails the very opposite of what you have denied—namely, that Allah creates something for the sake of something else and that He creates one thing by means of another. It also contradicts your assertion that every imaginable act is permissible for Him. What you have conceded is itself evidence that people can, to the extent possible, perceive the Lord’s wisdom and His purpose in creating something for another end, and that He, exalted be He, is far above acting in a way that would allow every conceivable deed to be attributed to Him indiscriminately.”

They add here: “A thing may well be possible and permissible even while we know that it will never actually occur—such as the mountains turning into ruby.”