any of the positive attributes; yet that is not what the Christians themselves say. It therefore becomes evident that in their declaration,

"The Lord is a substance,"

and in their further claim,

"Among substances are some in which no attributes subsist,"

they are siding with the pagan philosophers—Aristotle and his followers—rather than with the Messiah and the disciples. They first affirmed attributes for God in keeping with Christ and the apostles, only to re-cast Him as a substance and then assert,

"A subtle substance does not accommodate attributes."

This is the very doctrine of the pagan, attribute-negating philosophers. Thus what we have maintained about them is confirmed: they have cobbled together a creed partly from the religion of Christ and his disciples and partly from that of the unbelieving polytheists.

Accordingly, if by "accident" they mean what has just been described, then every substance admits attributes. But if by "accident" they intend what the philosophers call incidental attributes, as distinguished from essential ones—though such a distinction is not entailed by their own premises—we have explained elsewhere that the philosophers’ division of the necessary attributes of a thing into essential and incidental is unsound. Even were we to concede its soundness, the soul itself accepts incidental attributes, and so does every substance, whether subtle or dense.

Your assertion, then, that "a subtle substance does not admit accidents—such as the substance of the soul, the substance of the intellect, the substance of light, and other comparable subtle substances"—is false under every possible reading.