Now, once they label Him a substance, they are obliged to call His attributes accidents, for they themselves have said: “Nothing exists except substance or accident.” This, however, clashes with their other maxim:

“Whatever exists is either substance or accident; among existents there is nothing but one of these two.”

The logical consequence of their own words is that these attributes subsist in God’s very Essence—so how could they not subsist in the essence of anything else?

If they go on to say, “By accidents we mean only those attributes that arise in, or inhere within, bodies,” that, too, contradicts their principle that “whatever exists is either substance or accident,” especially when set beside their claims that “the Lord is a substance of three hypostases, and each hypostasis is both essence and attribute,” and that “the Lord is a substance.” Their statements thus entail that the Lord is a substance in which accidents reside—so what, then, of other beings?

Moreover, one may object: if they should posit the existence of a substance in which no accidents inhere, this is merely a terminological contrivance of theirs, aligning them with the philosophers who deny divine attributes—Aristotle and his circle—for such philosophers maintain: “The Lord is a substance to which no attribute can be ascribed…”