—for the angels may indeed be so described, even though, according to this technical usage, they are not bodies at all but spiritual substances. The same applies to the human soul when it leaves the body: nothing prevents one from ascribing to it whatever attributes are suitable to it, even though on this definition it is not a body.

It therefore becomes clear that denying the linguistic label “body” to a being does not prevent that being from possessing the attributes in question and others like them.

Now, if by “body” you mean something that exists in and of itself or that can be physically pointed at, then—even on your own principles—there is no bar to calling Him a body, for you have already called Him a jawhar (substance) and by that you mean something that subsists independently.

If a proof were forthcoming that every self-subsisting entity can be pointed at, He would likewise be pointable. And if a proof were produced that He subsists in Himself yet cannot be pointed at, He would still be both substance and body for anyone who defines “body” as “self-subsistent,” whereas for those who define it as “that which can be pointed at,” He would no longer count as a body. Hence, on your own premises, there is nothing to stop you from calling Him a body while also calling Him a substance—unless you can establish that there exists a self-subsisting substance that cannot be pointed at. You have offered no proof of this, and it is not the doctrine of the religious communities—Muslims, Jews, or Christians—but only the view of a faction of philosophers, with a few religionists tagging along.

We would add: you affirm that He is living and speaking, endowed with life and speech; indeed, you go further and assert that He is three hypostases.