Others said: “In all of existence there is only that which subsists in and of itself—this is the jism—or that which subsists through something else—this is the ʿaraḍ—and the jism is the nobler of the two.”

They went on to say: “What the first group calls a jawhar, this second group calls a jism; in either case the label is neither rooted in the Arabic language nor sanctioned by the Law.”

So, when the first group says, “He is a jawhar unlike other jawāhir,” just as one might say, “He is a thing unlike other things,” the second group replies, “Rather, He is a jism unlike other ajsām,” again using the expression, “He is a thing unlike other things.”

If the first group maintains, “A jawhar admits division into the dense and the subtle,” the second responds, “Likewise, a jism admits division into the subtle and the dense.”

The point here is that those who declare Him exalted above every impossibility of resembling created beings yet still call Him a jism may be disputing the negators merely over words—just as Christians debate the term “jawhar”—or they may be engaged in a rational dispute about the One indicated: Is He composed of indivisible particles, of matter and form, or of neither?

And should any of those who call Him a jism assert that He is composed of indivisible particles or of matter and form, such people are blameworthy in both wording and meaning according to